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Introduction to Brainerd Currie
Choice-of-Law Symposium

Brainerd Currie: I Am The Very
Model of a Modern Intellectual
by Jack L. Sammons*
I am sure some of you will remember the song, I Am the Very Model
of a Modern Major General from Gilbert and Sullivan's Pirates of
Penzance. For those of you who do not know him, let me introduce
Brainerd Currie to you by giving you his version of it:
The Behavioral Scientist
I am the very model of a modern intellectual;
I know the ruddy answers though I'm rather ineffectual.
I'm more sophisticated, son, than people clad in denim are:
When I have nothing much to say, I say it in a seminar.
I have a little paper on some matters psychological;
The highest courts know less than I of subjects pedagogical;

* Griffin B. Bell Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University.
Duke University (B.A., 1967); University of Georgia (J.D., 1974).
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I know which books are best to read, which symphonies are better.
Ah! I'm very well informed upon aesthetics and et cetera.
I know a thing or two about the sciences behavioralTo which to foster, fellows stout, you sacrificed and gave your all.
I know about relations, both platonical and sexualIn short, I am the model of a modern intellectual.
I'll tackle any snafu with a model mathematical;
Tough legal problems vanish when I use my method graphical;
My judgment is impeccable on matters architectural;
I'm very adamant about most things that are conjectural;
At regulating conflicts I am pretty near infallible;
On values my opinipns are reportedly invaluable;
Quite modestly, I see myself an elegantly mentored manThe jealous critics call me a complacently self-Centered man.
I ken the social sciences and eke the poor humanities;
My imprimatur sanctifies the veriest inanities;
I understand philosophy, pragmatic and conceptualYou see, I am the model of a modern intellectual.
I flatter me that I know free-dom from responsibility
My fellowship maintains me in respectable gentility;
My coffee-steeped opinions have remarkable felicity;
My knowledge is distinguished for its very catholicity.
I'm right on top of inside dope on Little Rock and satellites,
On horseshoe pitching, Dead Sea scrolls, and even western cattle
rights,
On how to tune a motor and on how to make a Chevvy singI think I ought to organize a Seminar on EVERYTHING!
My friends are IBM machines, my methods are statistical;
My just reflections on myself are somewhat narcissistical;
And though my lucubrations may be mostly ineffectual,
I am the very model of a modern intellectual.'
I want to turn this good humored doggerel around on Professor Currie
just a little, this morning, by treating him seriously as a model, not of
the modern intellectual he described so well for goodness sake, but of
law professing, or, better said, as the way by which we once knew what
a model law professor was. This is, of course, a beginning exercise in

1. This poem was first published by Phillip Kurland as an appendage to an untitled
tribute he wrote to Brainerd Currie in 1966. Philip B. Kurland, BrainerdCurrie-Five
Tributes, 1966 DUKE L.J. 2, 8-9 (citing Brainerd Currie, The Behavioral Scientist,
previously unpublished). In Currie's original version he credited authorship to "Not-G"
with the footnote: "All poetry may be divided into two categories: (1) That written by W.
S. Gilbert (G), and (2) All other (Not-G)." Id.
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virtue ethics, an exercise in which we examine someone we have
admired within our practice not for his ethics, but as an ethic.
I think Professor Currie would have approved of this way of thinking
about him (although, for a man as retiring as he, surely it would have
been an embarrassment). The most distinctive feature of virtue ethics
is its contextuality, and no word is more descriptive of Brainerd Currie's
thinking on all subjects than "contextual." I have also noticed that when
Brainerd Currie talked of legal education and legal ethics2 he did so in
words that would be comfortable apparel for even the most carefully
attired of virtue ethicist. For example, starting with his earliest
article,3 the production of a certain kind of person is the only honest
objective of legal education for Currie. The person he had in mind was
a good lawyer to be sure, but a good lawyer of a very particular kind,
one who by reason of his virtuousness 4 justifies the place of legal
education within the university. So, given his own proclivities, surely
Currie would have been comfortable with this approach to him.
Those who have read his work on legal education, a subject he
returned to frequently throughout most of his career, will notice that, far
more than most writers on this subject, Currie's thoughts are always
consistent with his pedagogical teleology. They are always consistent,
that is, with this idea of producing a certain kind of person; just as his
thought on the law, including on conflicts of law, are always consistent
with a certain social teleology, a certain view of community toward
which he was always moving. The only way Currie could have achieved
such remarkable consistency is by carefully holding on to clear visions
of what kind of people we must be to be good lawyers, and what kind of
laws we must have to be good people, as constant criteria for his work.
This he did with visions formed very early in his career, many of which
can be found in his work on the materials of legal education at
Columbia, published later in the Journal of Legal Education.5 As I

2. Currie often made a point in his writing of not distinguishing between legal
education and the teaching of legal ethics. This itself is very telling for virtue ethics.
3. Brainerd Currie, The Law School As An EducationalInstitution, 24 WASH. U. L.Q.
476 (1938). This earliest of Currie articles is remarkable for the tension it displays
between the writer's obviously mature wisdom and his still youthful search for an
appropriate voice. It was this piece that prompted Columbia Law School, which had
recently turned much of its attention to legal education, to offer the young Currie a
substantial scholarship for its graduate program.
4. These virtues were, primarily, and as is fitting of the time in which Brainerd Currie
taught, the virtues of the good American citizen.
5. Brainerd Currie, The Materials of Law Study, 3 J. OF LEGAL EDuc. 331 (1951);
Brainerd Currie, The Materials of Law Study 8 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1955).
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have come to know him through others, this now seems to me to be a
"Brainerd Currie-like thing to do."
This last observation, then, is an example of how I want us to think
about Professor Currie this morning. Exploring the descriptive phrase,
"a Brainerd Currie-like thing to do," is the task at hand. It is an
important task. Terry Sandalow, the former Dean of the University of
Michigan Law School, said, "When I started teaching in 1961 everybody
knew what a good law professor was. It was Brainerd Currie."6 If law
professors today are to make useful sense of Dean Sandalow's observation for our time, if we are to reflect on our heroes in communal selfscrutiny as a way of understanding our own tradition of law professing,
we should try to -recaptue .what it is to do our work in a Brainerd
Currie-like manner. And, if the law students of today are to learn how
to evaluate their law professors, which of us to listen to, which to ignore,
which to admire and which to scorn, based on the standards that we
professors, as a practice, have set for ourselves, they will need to do the
same.
We can get a small start on this task today: first by examining how
odd it is, at first blush, that Sandalow's generation would choose
Professor Currie as its exemplar of excellence, and then by briefly
describing some of Currie's intellectual virtues. Much more of what I
think you and I need to do to discover what Brainerd Currie has to say
to us today, however, can be done far better by our listening very
carefully, and with just a touch of sympathetic detachment, to the round
table discussions that follow these remarks. Through these discussions
we can get a far better sense of the virtuousness of Professor Currie's
work, not just by becoming more familiar with one area in which he
toiled, but through the application and the criticism of his work by
others, both those who agree with his conclusions and those who do not.
(For virtue ethics, this difference in agreement about conclusions makes
no difference at all). There could be no better tribute to Brainerd Currie
today than the one Professor Bruce Posnak has chosen for him: to
continue the hard work of case analysis in conflicts of interest, the hard
work of shaping the law of conflicts to match the world, the hard work
of continuing to see the world, as Currie did, in this very difficult grain
of sand, and to try to do all of this in a Brainerd Currie-like manner.
What a fool I am to attempt even my very limited task of introducing
Brainerd Currie to you before this discussion. In the audience today we
have Elmyr "Pick" Currie, Brainerd's wife, David, one of two sons, and
Carolyn, his daughter. We also have a former student, a colleague, and

6. Telephone conversation with Terrance M. Sandalow, Edson R. Sunderland Professor
of Law, University of Michigan Law School (Oct. 14, 1989) (transcript on file with author).

1997]

INTRODUCTION TO SYMPOSIUM

others who knew this man as well as he could be known. At the table
today we also have some of those within the legal academy who know his
conflicts of law work best, the work in which, according to most, he best
displayed what a Brainerd Currie-like manner is. For those of you who
do know him so well, my hope is that you will at least find the mistakes
I make about this wonderful man, whom I have come to love through
you, and most especially through Mrs. Currie, interesting mistakes.
Let me start then with the observation of how very odd it first appears
that Brainerd Currie would be the model of excellence for a generation
of law professors. Although his educational record was certainly
exceptional-as best I can tell through all of the correlations that have
to be made, to this day no one has exceeded his marks at this Law
School-we would have to say that his education was provincial. Before
coming to Mercer, he attended the Academy of Richmond County in
Augusta. Then, after two years, to the young Currie two terribly boring
years, working as a clerk for an auditor with the Georgia and Florida
Railroad to help his family through rough financial times, he went to the
Junior College of Augusta. It seems odd now that he did not complete
his undergraduate education until after his graduation from law school,
but this was not an unusual occurrence then, at least it was not so in
the South.
I do not mean to suggest that the educational institutions he attended
were not good institutions. They were, in fact, quite exceptional ones.
Lawton Evans, the Superintendent of the Academy of Richmond County
for fifty-one years, for example, was a noted author, a recipient of the
President's Medal from Columbia, a Trustee of the Carnegie Endowment,
and Secretary of the National Educators Association. Mercer Law
School, during Currie's tenure here, was blessed with a well-credentialed, case-method, faculty that was truly extraordinary for such a
small, financially struggling, Southern institution, held together at
times, almost as sheer act of will by its then Dean, Augustus Bootle.
No, these were good institutions. I am suggesting, however, that this
is not the expected educational background for a model law professor.
Neither do we find the expected model in his publications, his associations with particular institutions, nor, finally, in the manner of the man.
He did not become a model for others by being made famous as a
textbook writer for West Publishing Company, or by long years of good
service to a particular law school, or by drawing attention to himself.
Hie writings, those on conflicts, the materials of law study, and
admiralty, are very well known, of course, but they are not the stuff of
great popular fame even within the legal academy. He never stayed long
enough at any one school to become famous through an association with
institutional accomplishments, traveling, as he did, in rather rapid
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succession from Mercer to Wake Forest (where the Dean gave him the
extremely awkward task, along with I. Beverly Lake, of demonstrating
for senior members of the faculty, all of whom were excellent lecturers,
how to teach using the case method). From Wake Forest, Brainerd
Currie went to graduate school at Columbia, and then back South for
one year at the University of Georgia, where he soon joined other law
professors for well-publicized and, even for that time, ludicrous nightlyarmed patrols of the Athens Water Tower to prevent Nazi saboteurs
from destroying it.
After failing his voluntary enlistment physical due to nearsightedness,
off Currie went to Washington, D.C., first to work at the Office of Price
Administration (where he led the crackdown on black market lumber
chiselers) and later to the Office of Economic Stabilization, making his
reputation as one of the most promising of the young law professors
brought to Washington during World War II. This D.C. experience
greatly added to Currie's self-confidence. He knew far better now how
to place himself in the world.
After the War, back he went to the Southeast to teach at Duke, to edit
the Journal of Law and Contemporary Problems and a fledgling
publication, the Journal of Legal Education. From there, the family
went West for a disappointing three years at the University of California
at Los Angeles, a new law school headed by a very dynamic, but very
difficult dean who had handpicked a combination of the best and
brightest of young professors, and a few of the most honored of older
ones, including Roscoe Pound, to be his first faculty.
Currie escaped from UCLA through an appointment as Dean of the
University of Pittsburgh Law School. His brief tenure there is remembered best for the quality of his speeches, and the good example of his
hard work, rather than for any other particular institutional accomplishments. Finally, he began the longest affiliation of his career, seven
years at the University of Chicago. This too, however, was interrupted
by a sabbatical fellowship at the Center for Advanced Behavioral
Sciences in California, a Center whose style was widely described at the
time as the "Leisure of the Theory Class." According to most, Brainerd
Currie did his best work there. From Chicago, now nearing the end of
this arduous academic journey, he returned to the South, to country
sausage and barbeque, and to Duke University, seeking, but sadly not
finding, the happiness of former Southern times.
Little in Brainerd Currie's manner would have made you think of him
as the model for law professing. He was always quiet and generally
reserved; his was not an electrifying presence, but as his good friend
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Chief Justice Roger Traynor described him, a "glowing one." ' His
freshly ironed clothes always managed to look a bit rumpled after a few
minutes of wear. His classes frequently started haltingly and with a
quivering voice, as did his speeches, before he and his students or his
audience warmed to the subject before them. As one of his students
said, "he was neither grandiloquent nor inarticulate, rather he possessed
a simple eloquence that summoned attention to the idea, not the
speaker."8 He raised his voice only when he thought it was absolutely
necessary. It was absolutely necessary only when singing Italian opera,
especially with his soprano sister-in-law late in the evenings of her visits
to the Currie home, or perhaps necessary for his beloved Gilbert and
Sullivan to be well heard over his rhythmic pounding on an old piano at
faculty gatherings, a pounding that was, well, perhaps a little too
vigorous, since, according to the more musically-correct pianist in the
family, Mrs. Currie, Brainerd's left-hand movements were mostly
random.
Outside music, however, so soft-spoken was he that, while at Columbia
working on his LL.M., one of his professors, Elliott Cheatham, who,
along with Dale Stansbury, his colleague at Mercer and his dean at
Wake Forest, was his most important mentor, said to him: "Brainerd,
let me take advantage of my position on this side of the desk and yours
on that side, to tell you that I think it would be wise if you spoke a little
louder." Professor Cheatham was, by all accounts, the most gentlemanly
of men, and I am sure he would not have called attention to the failings
of another were the situation not desperate. Even Cheatham's warning,
however, the warning from the man after whom Brainerd and Pick were
to name one of their sons, was to no avail.
This, then, is not what we would expect, would we, as an exemplar of
excellence for an entire generation of distinguished law professors: this
extremely soft spoken, slightly rumpled, friendly and approachable, but
also nervous, rather anxious, and often shy man? Soon after he arrived
at Wake Forest, and having a little more money than he did at Mercer,
Brainerd realized he needed a new suit. He went to a local clothier and
ordered two suits that were exactly alike. His former student and then
colleague, Francis Paschal, asked him: "Why in the world did you do
that, Brainerd?" "Well," Brainerd replied, "it is embarrassing for me
when I get a new suit for somebody to notice it, so I thought at least

7. This is from Judge Traynor's tribute to Currie, published untitled in Brainerd
Currie-Five Tributes, 1966 DuKE L.J. 2, 9. The tribute was reprinted in the Brainerd
CurrieMemorial Edition, 28 MERCER L. REv. 441 (1977) [hereinafter Traynor].
8. This is from Robert C. Sink's untitled tribute to Currie in Brainerd Currie-Five
Tributes, 1966 DUKE L.J. 2, 17 [hereinafter Sink].
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when the first one wore out I could just shift into the second one and
nobody would know~ the difference."' As you can see, this was not
someone who wanted to call attention to himself.
I do not want to mislead you here. Please do not mistake this shyness
or the nervousness for meekness or timidity. There was absolutely
nothing meek nor timid in Professor Currie's makeup. He was instead
a very demanding man. The standard of excellence that he imposed
upon himself and others, and the difficulty he had with those, including
himself, when they did not measure up to it, can still be frightening,
especially for such a casual thinker as I. As many have said, to be his
conversational partner was as humbling as it was invigorating. The
same is true, I can tell you, for being his conversational partner through
others who knew him well.
For most of his life, I believe, Brainerd Currie knew his work was
good, as he should have, although he seldom let anyone other than his
wife, Pick, know his opinion of it. To others, including his children, he
expressed only the doubts that his method requires. There is, however,
a Currie difference in his attitude toward his work. Good work, for
Currie, was not the work of brilliance, not the work of creativity, but the
work of work. It was the work of curiosity, of concentration, and of
disciplined thought. His ideas were good, he knew, not because they
were his, but because they were the product of good work. His work
could be good because he knew the process that produced it, the oh-socareful plodding analysis of common law reasoning reconnected, through
the clear vision of Currie's jurisprudence, with the truthful details of the
human world, was a good process. All that he brought to this process,
he thought, was the curiosity, the concentration and the discipline it
required of its practitioners.
When he judged the work of others, it was most often not for its
intelligence, or brilliance, or creativity, but instead by this standard:
How well did this work meet the requirements of this good process? I
must tell you, however, in fairness to the rest of us, that the powers of
curiosity, concentration, and disciplined thought that Brainerd Currie
brought to this process were truly exceptional. The most frequently
recurring theme in all the conversations I have had with people about
Brainerd Currie is his unique ability to concentrate, or, as his young
daughter, Carolyn, described it when the family was living in Durham
and her father would remain unmoving in the car long after everyone
else had gone in, an ability to "space out" when he needed.' °

9. Interview with Elmyr Currie (various dates, 1988-1997) (transcript on file with
author).
10. Id.
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Brainerd Currie had this unique ability from the earliest of the
lamplighter days of his childhood near the Green Street Presbyterian
Church in Augusta, Georgia, the Church in which his mother served as
an elder in everything but name and not in name because she felt that
doing so was inappropriate for a woman. When Brainerd returned to
Augusta with this strong and strong-willed mother after her separation
from his equally strong-willed, but perhaps more subtle, minister father,
and after his father's subsequent demitting from the church, he would
often spend hours in the library of Dr. McFarrin, Green Street's
prominent and powerful minister, or in the libraries of his grandfather
or great-grandfather, both of whom lived near the Church. There he
would read all that he could but often came back, even at age eleven, to
Blackstone. The family said that were a fire in the house, were there an
explosion, Brainerd would not have known it until the roof fell in on
him, so absorbed would he be in his readings. He was joined in this
concentration, this studiousness, by his boyhood friend, David Potter.
Potter later became a famous historian and, purely by chance, joined the
Leisure of the Theory Class while Brainerd was there. Potter's more
cosmopolitan family first introduced Brainerd to the world beyond Green
Street.
His studiousness, his curiosity, and his desire to get to the "nitty gritty
of things," as most of his relatives described it, however, went far beyond
his association with David Potter. For this audience I need only to tell
you one story to confirm this. As his brother, Marion Currie, recalls it,
when Brainerd was twelve he would walk across the Savannah River
with Marion to go to a swimming hole known as Getson's Pond. Now
when you cross the Savannah River you cross from Georgia into South
Carolina. On one trip, young Brainerd asked Marion: "Just suppose,
Marion, there was a murder in Augusta and the murderer fled across
the Savannah River only to be arrested in South Carolina. Where would
they try the case and what law would they apply?" Later, on the next
trip to Getson's Pond, Marion says, Brainerd, picking up the subject as
if he had just dropped it, asked: "And what if the murderer shot from
the North side of the River and hit his victim on the South side?"1
From this episode you can see that Brainerd Currie came by his
interest in law quite naturally. There was never, according to his aunt,
any notion of Brainerd not being a lawyer. After a flirtation with
medicine, Marion became the minister everyone expected the Currie boys
to be, and his older sister, Margaret, went off to Emory to become a
nurse, following in the footsteps of a beloved aunt. There was, however,

11. Interview with Marion Currie (Nov. 5, 1988).
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nothing but the law for Brainerd. When he was sixteen, Dr. McFarrin,
who had taken a fatherly interest in him after the separation, had one
conversation with Brainerd about his choice of occupations. McFarrin
asked if Brainerd thought he could be honest as a lawyer. Brainerd
replied: "If I can't be honest as a lawyer, I couldn't be honest as a
preacher either."12 That was the last effort anyone made to question
his choice of professions.
We can see this same young man, this same gifted child, this same
intense concentration, this same driving curiosity, this same love for the
law, in Francis Allen's image of Brainerd as a colleague at Chicago:
He had a portable blackboard in his office, and he would draw these
intricate diagrams that no one but Brainerd could decipher. But the
thing that was so amazing was how deeply he would be caught up in
this. He often kept the door to his office open. You would go down the
corridor and look in his office and there Brainerd would be at his desk
staring at the blackboard and the diagrams almost transfixed. You

could come back an hour later and Brainerd would still be sitting
there, apparently having not moved an inch in the interval. It was an
enormous capacity and I don't think I have known anyone that had
that more strongly than he did. 3
One price Professor Currie paid for this enormous capacity of
concentration is the usual one; he was just as absentminded as the
stereotype of thoughtful professors tells us he should be. This was
beautifully, and very succinctly described by Mrs. Currie, when she told
me: "Brainerd could forget anything except an idea."14 Even this
absentmindedness, though it fits well the stereotypical professor, is not
what we expect of someone who was the model law professor, so closely
wed are law professors to a practice in which absentmindedness is surely
a vice. So the oddity remains that it was to Brainerd Currie that Terry
Sandalow's generation of professors, coming into teaching in the late
fifties and early sixties, turned for a model of what they wanted to
become.
Yet isn't this the way of the world? Aren't we always surprised by our
heroes? Aren't great artists or artisans, like their art, great to us
because we did not expect what they offered?"5 And isn't this a

12. Id.
13. Interview with Francis A. Allen, Huber C. Hurst Eminent Scholar, University of
Florida College of Law (Mar. 7, 1991) (transcript on file with author).
14. Interview with Elmyr Currie (various dates, 1988-1997) (transcript on file with
author).
15. My colleague Hal Lewis has graciously asked me to rethink this, but I think I will
stick with what I say in the text although it is not quite right. Currie is a surprise to us
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blessing for our study of Brainerd Currie? If Brainerd Currie had
achieved his fame in a more usual manner, we would have had to cull
appearance from reality and convention from a truer quality. If he had
been more expected, we would need to work hard to separate the wheat
from the chaff. With a man like Currie, however, it is all wheat. He
was what he was for a generation of law professors because of his merit
alone-his merit as a teacher, as a scholar, as a writer, as a colleague,
and as a friend.
Before turning to a description of the intellectual virtues displayed
through his work as a teacher and scholar, the virtues I hope you will
use as standards in listening to the discussion that follows, I want to
talk briefly about his merit as a colleague and as a friend. Much of what
I might say about this you can probably imagine for yourself: the
interesting and educational conversations with this imminently
clubbable Renaissance man who made violins, told good stories well,
sang in Italian, taught all the courses in the curriculum, loved the law,
and loved language in the way that any good craftsman loves the tool he
uses. Surely you must already know the charming wittiness and good
humor of the author of the poem I read at the beginning, or the far more
famous Rose of Aberlone, a poem still found in any good first year
contracts text. On and on we could go with his obvious collegial
qualities.
There are, however, two aspects of his relationships with his
colleagues that may escape you. The first is easy. Unlike some other
intellectuals, Professor Currie enjoyed all manner of people; he did not
suffer pretentiousness well, but he found something that he could learn
from everyone he met. If you were human, you were interesting to
Brainerd Currie, and if you were a law student or a law professor, so
much the better. The second aspect is more difficult. His dear friend,
Chief Justice Roger Traynor, noted it best:

in two ways. As I have argued, there is little in his background to prepare us for his
becoming a mentor to a generation of law professors. This kind of surprise is true to a
tradition of surprises dating back at least to Abraham and Moses. But Currie also
surprises us in his work. He was, as I have pictured him, the most carefully contextual
of thinkers and yet what he is best known for is a grand theory. Currie surely excelled
within a particular tradition of the practice of professing the law, and there is no surprise
in that, but while being true to this tradition he also revealed something new. This idea
of being surprised by those who are true to a tradition by transcending it is from Quentin
Bell's famous lecture, Bad Art. Quentin Bell, Bad Art, in CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN
MoRAL PHILOSOPHY: REvISIONS (Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair Maclntyre, eds., Notre
Dame Press, 1983).
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This lawyer par excellence, tending the law's ills with devotion,
commanded affection and respect on other counts beside his professional gifts and involvement .... [When he entered a room, casting a shy
smile about him, his quiet manner suggested friendliness rather than
reticence, and even a tender of very present help in trouble .... One
was reassured by his company. There was hope for the sad world if
only once in a while, if only here and there,
a man like Brainerd Currie
6
appeared and worked to make it better.
Traynor's phrase, "even a tender of very present help in trouble"17
puzzled me. Professor Currie was not a man of action. (Mrs. Currie will
tell you, with great and gentle humor, that he was almost worthless in
an emergency). There is, however, something in the phrase that
correctly captures a certain reassurance that many of his colleagues
received from Brainerd Currie. I think I have come to know what this
is from conversations with them. There are people on my own faculty
whose company is reassuring to me in much the same way. I know that
if troubles arise'among us that they will, because of how they approach
the world, offer the stability of careful thought, the patience of good
judgment; they Will see to it that my own thinking does not go too far
astray from the person they know me to be. These are people who know,
as Traynor said Currie knew, "that there is great trouble in the world,
casting its shadow on each of us, but that of course we [can] stand
together against it."" Yet, Traynor goes on to say, Currie's message to
his friends was,
Rather a challenge, is it not, to reckon with the misfortunes that could
engulf us one by one or en masse and still not let it diminish the
present joyousness of good company. If there were no happy endings,
there was still happiness to be seized for the occasion. So [Brainerd]
would begin to discourse on all manner of things, on law, on some
small adventure of the day, and he would bend an ear for the listener's
rejoinder. There would be an entente cordiale and he would warm to
the subject, and, if it were not a legal one, it usually led back to the
law. His words had the sounds of pebbles deftly tossed in the sea. One
heard their repercussion for days. 9
Of such was his merit as a colleague, as a friend, and these repercussions continue today, though there are no pebbles tossed.

16.
17.
18.
19.

Traynor, supra note 7, at 13-14 (emphasis added).
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 14.
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If you are a dean of a law school, you had best pay attention to a
colleague like this, for it is in such people that true power lies in any law
school! Dean Edward Levi, at the University of Chicago, knew this well.
He told us that before every faculty meeting he went to Brainerd's office
to see what he was going fo say.2" When Brainerd did speak at a
faculty meeting, it was always crisp and to the point. Walter Blum of
Chicago, someone who would know, said: "You could have copied his
dialogue and with very little editing it would have been ready for
publication."21
Now what of his work? What of his teaching? What of his writing?
What now of how he defined the intellectual virtues for us? I have gone
on at length and only hinted at the intellectual virtues he displayed.
But there is nothing mysterious here. He simply did better, and with
better adaptation to the truth, what others in a certain, mostly American
tradition of legal thinking always wanted to do. The virtue terms we
should use to describe his work, both his teaching and his writing, are
honesty, integrity, humility, patience, and a steadfast devotion to the
truth. There is surely nothing unusual in these. What we can learn
from Brainerd Currie, however, is what virtue terms like these might
mean in an approach to the law.
His approach to the law, his approach to all things really, was bottom
up and inductive. In writing about law, you start with the cases and
you do not generalize until you are certain that you have them right. In
Wittgenstein's extreme terms, you don't think, you look. To do this well
requires a humility toward the materials of the law, a certain doggedness and determination, and, most important, a patience that most of us
now lack. It also requires great intellectual honesty, an absolute refusal
to bend the materials of the law to your own purposes, and a personal
clarity, a careful self-reflectiveness, on what your own purposes might
be.
Part of what this means for law professors is that our work must be
our own. Currie's advice to young colleagues was usually the same: Look
for yourself. Your thinking should be your own and not derivative; not
secondary to the work of others. Go to the materials of the law, the
materials of our study as professors, and work them for yourself.
In teaching, and in learning, Currie tells us, you start with the facts
of legal disputes, and you stay with those facts, until the case is well
grounded in all its humanity. The case itself, then, can become a source

20. Interview with Edward H. Levi, Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor
Emeritus, University of Chicago (May 27, 1989) (transcript on file with author).
21. Interview with Walter J. Blum, Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor
Emeritus, University of Chicago (May 23, 1989) (transcript on file with author).
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of truth that is held out equally against the student and the professor
so that the exercise of learning is one done together in the classroom.
Professor Currie cared nothing about the reconciling or distinguishing
of cases, the sequencing of cases, the categorizing of cases, or the
classification of cases until this first task was done well. There was in
fact, as his former student Dallin Oaks told us, nothing more appalling
to Professor Currie than an opinion by a judge which ignored the
humanity of the claim before him.22
There is an interesting connection here, I think, between this sense of
the humanity of the law and the fact that the way Brainerd Currie
discussed the law with students and with colleagues was always as
story, as narrative. His colleague, Walter Blum, described it this way:
And the way he would tell the story of a case, it was like hearing a
narrator describe it. I think of some of my other colleagues whom,
when they presented something, it was with such force and gusto that,
if you did not get on the trolley at the right time, you were not going
to ever make it. But with Brainerd, each case was a way of coming
back to storytelling. He would talk about these problems just the way
he would tell some other story. In the process of doing it, the issues
would emerge, but he wouldn't start with the issues, he always started
with the facts, embellished in just the right way.23
His famous association with legal realism, with Llewellyn and
Minchnikoff and others, and his use of the social sciences were, I believe,
nothing other than a reflection of this. The corruption he sought to
avoid through legal realism was artificialness-too narrow a definition
of the discipline of the law that would separate it from its human,
sometimes all-too-human, narrative base. This was never said better
than by his Duke student, Robert Sink. "He lived with the law," Sink
said, "which by his translation meant people."24
The most pressing current problem for law professing is that we no
longer know how to do this. We no longer know how to translate the law
to people rather than the other way around. We no longer know how to
understand the limits of the discipline of law and, because we do not, we
corrupt the law with other disciplines. My suggestion, as a virtue
ethicist, would be that we stop thinking about this and start instead
looking more carefully at how someone like Brainerd Currie worked
through this problem. For here was a man who was among the first to

22. Telephone interview with Elder Dallin Oaks (Sept. 25, 1989) (transcript on file with
author).
23. Interview with Walter J. Blum, Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor
Emeritus, University of Chicago (May 23, 1989) (transcript on file with author).
24. Sink, supra note 8, at 18.
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use the work of other disciplines in shaping the law and yet one who
steadfastly maintained the disciplinary lines of his work as a lawyer.
He knew, in other words, how to take law seriously and yet keep it from
being exclusive, keep it open to others, so that others could keep it open
to its own humanity. Surely we can learn from this example.
It is time for me to turn you over to those who will do what I have
only been describing. I want to end with a quotation from Stanley
Hauerwas, a theologian friend of mine, that I think nicely captures what
we may be able to learn from Brainerd Currie as a teacher and as a
scholar:
Education calls for a patient standing before that which we know not
in order to know. Disinterestedness is the hallmark of education, for
it requires unselfing that we might be open to that not present in our
interests and assumptions of relevancy. Disinterest is not the
precondition of intellectual endeavor necessary because the truth
cannot be known, but because it can ... . For the truth is not less real

for its being clothed in the contingencies and ambiguities of our
historical existence.2"
Hauerwas goes on to say: "Education, as I am conceiving of it here, is
a painful process for student and teacher, because truth is such a tiring
business."26
This was true for Brainerd Currie. It was a tiring business. Yet, in
the best of times for this most remarkable man, and in quiet, soft-spoken
conversations with students, with colleagues, with family and with
friends, truth could also be a joyous business that held the pain at bay.

25.
26.

STANLEY HAUERWAS, VISION AND VIRTUE 122 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
Id. at 123.

